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The approximation introduced by finite-precision representation of continuous data can induce ar-
bitrarily large information leaks even when the computation using exact semantics is secure. Such
leakage can thus undermine design efforts aimed at protecting sensitive information. We focus here
on differential privacy, an approach to privacy that emerged from the area of statistical databases and
is now widely applied also in other domains. In this approach, privacy is protected by the addition of
noise to a true (private) value. To date, this approach to privacy has been proved correct only in the
ideal case in which computations are made using an idealized, infinite-precision semantics. In this
paper, we analyze the situation at the implementation level, where the semantics is necessarily finite-
precision, i.e. the representation of real numbers and the operations on them, are rounded according
to some level of precision. We show that in general there are violations of the differential privacy
property, and we study the conditions under which we can still guarantee a limited (but, arguably,
totally acceptable) variant of the property, under only a minor degradation of the privacy level. Fi-
nally, we illustrate our results on two cases of noise-generating distributions: the standard Laplacian
mechanism commonly used in differential privacy, and a bivariate version of the Laplacian recently
introduced in the setting of privacy-aware geolocation.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that, due to the physical limitations of actual machines, in particular the finiteness of
their memory, real numbers and their operations cannot be implemented with full precision. While for
traditional computation getting an approximate result is not critical when a bound on the error is known,
we argue that, in security applications, the approximation error can became a fingerprint potentially
causing the disclosure of secrets.
Obviously, the standard techniques to measure the security breach do not apply, because an analysis
of the system in the ideal (aka exact) semantics does not reveal the information leaks caused by the
implementation. Consider, for instance, the following simple program
if f (h)> 0 then ℓ= 0 else ℓ= 1
where h is a high (i.e., confidential) variable and ℓ is a low (i.e., public) variable. Assume that h can take
two values, v1 and v2, and that both f (v1) and f (v2) are strictly positive. Then, in the ideal semantics,
the program is perfectly secure, i.e. it does not leak any information. However, in the implementation, it
could be the case that the test succeeds in the case of v1 but not in the case of v2 because, for instance,
the value of f (v2) is below the smallest representable positive number. Hence, we would have a total
disclosure of the secret value.
∗This work has been partially supported by the project ANR-09-BLAN-0345-02 CPP and by the INRIA Action d’Envergure
CAPPRIS.
2 Preserving differential privacy
The example above is elementary but it should give an idea of the pervasive nature of the problem,
which can have an impact in any confidentiality setting, and should therefore receive attention by those
researchers interested in (quantitative) information flow. In this paper, we initiate this investigation with
an in-depth study of the particular case of differential privacy.
Differential privacy [10, 11] is an approach to the protection of private information that originated
in the field of statistical databases and is now investigated in many other domains, ranging from pro-
gramming languages [3, 12] to social networks [20] and geolocation [17, 15, 2, 6]. The key idea behind
differential privacy is that whenever someone queries a dataset, the reported answer should not allow him
to distinguish whether a certain individual record is in the dataset or not. More precisely, the presence or
absence of the record should not change significantly the probability of obtaining a given answer. The
standard way of achieving such a property is by using an oblivious mechanism1 which consists in adding
some noise to the true answer. Now the point is that, even if such a mechanism is proved to provide the
desired property in the ideal semantics, its implementation may induce errors that alter the least signif-
icant digits of the reported answer and cause significant privacy breaches. Let us illustrate the problem
with an example.
Example 1.1. Consider the simplest representation of reals: the fixed-point numbers. This representation
is used on low-cost processors which do not have floating-point arithmetic module. Each value is stored
in a memory cell of fixed length. In such cells, the last d digits represent the fractional part. Thus, if
the value (interpreted as an integer) stored in the cell is z, its semantics (i.e., the true real number being
represented) is z ·2−d.
To grant differential-privacy, the standard technique consists of returning a random value with prob-
ability p(x) = 1/2b · e−|x−r|/b where r is the true result and b is a scale parameter which depends on the
degree of privacy to be obtained and on the sensitivity of the query. To get a random variable with any
specific distribution, in general, we need to start with an initial random variable provided by a primitive
of the machine with a given distribution. To simplify the example, we assume that the machine already
provides a Laplacian random variable X with a scale parameter 1. The probability distribution of such an
X is pX(x) = 1/2e−|x|. Hence, if we want to generate the random variable bX with probability distribution
pbX (x) = 1/2b · e−|x|/b, we can just multiply by b the value x = z ·2−d returned by the primitive.
Assume that we want to add noise with a scale parameter b = 2n for some fixed integer n (b can
be big when the sensitivity of the query and the required privacy degree are high). In this case, the
multiplication by 2n returns a number 2nz · 2−d that, in the fixed-point representation terminates with n
zeroes. Hence, when we add this noise to the true result, we return a value whose representation has
the same n last digits as the secret. For example, assume b = 22 = 4 and d = 6. Consider that the true
answers are r1 = 0 and r2 = 1+2−5. In the fixed-point representation, the last two digits of r1 are 00, and
the last two digits of r2 are 10. Hence, even after we add the noise, we can always tell whether the true
value was r1 or r2. Note that the same example holds for every b = 2n and every pair of true values r1
and r2 which differ by (2nk+h)/2d where k is any integer and h is any integer between 1 and 2n−1. Figure
1 illustrates the situation for b = 4, k = 3 and h = 2.
Another attack, based on the IEEE standard floating-point representation [16], was presented in [19].
In contrast to [19], we have chosen an example based on the fixed point representation because it allows
to illustrate more distinctively a problem for privacy which rises from the finite precision2 and which
1The name “oblivious” comes from the fact that the final answer depends only on the answer to the query and not on the
dataset.
2More precisely, the problem is caused by scaling a finite set of randomly generated numbers. It is easy to prove that the
problem raises for any implementation of numbers, although it may not raise for every point like in the case of the fixed-point
representation.
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Figure 1: The probability distribution of the reported answers after the addition of Laplacian noise for
the true answer r1 = 0 (black) and r2 = 3 ·2−4 +2−5 (green).
is, therefore, pandemic. (This is not the case for the example in [19]: fixed-point and integer-valued
algorithms are immune to that attack.)
In this paper, we propose a solution to fix the privacy breach induced by the finite-precision imple-
mentation of a differentially-private mechanism for any kind of implementation. Our main concern is
to establish a bound on the degradation of privacy induced by both the finite representation and by the
computational errors in the generation of the noise. In order to achieve this goal, we use the concept of
closeness introduced by the authors in [13], which allows us to reason about the approximation errors
and their accumulation. We make as few assumptions as possible about the procedure for generating the
noise. In particular, we do not assume that the noise has a linear Laplacian distribution: it can be any
noise that provides differential privacy and whose implementation satisfies a few properties (normally
granted by the implementation of real numbers) which ensure its closeness. We illustrate our method
with two examples: the classic case of the univariate (i.e., linear) Laplacian, and the case of the bivariate
Laplacian. The latter distribution is used, for instance, to generate noise in privacy-aware geolocation
mechanisms [2].
1.1 Related work
As far as we know, the only other work that has considered the problem introduced by the finite precision
in the implementation of differential privacy is [19]. As already mentioned, that paper showed an attack
on the Laplacian-based implementation of differential privacy within the IEEE standard floating-point
representation3 . To thwart such an attack, the author of [19] proposed a method that avoids using the
standard uniform random generator for floating point (because it does not draw all representable numbers
but only multiple of 2−53). Instead, his method generates two integers, one for the mantissa and one for
the exponent in such a way that every representable number is drawn with its correct probability. Then
it computes the linear Laplacian using a logarithm implementation (assumed to be full-precision), and
finally it uses a snapping mechanism consisting in truncating large values and then rounding the final
result.
The novelties of our paper, w.r.t. [19], consist in the fact that we deal with a general kind of noise, not
necessarily the linear Laplacian, and with any kind of implementation of real numbers, not necessarily
3We discovered our attack independently, but [19] was published first.
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the IEEE floating point standard. Furthermore, our kind of analysis allows us to measure how safe an
existing solution can be and what to do if the requirements needed for the safety of this solution are
not met. Finally, we consider our correct implementation of the bivariate Laplacian also as a valuable
contribution, given its practical usefulness for location-based applications.
The only other work we are aware of, considering both computational error and differential privacy, is
[8]. However, that paper does not consider at all the problem of the loss of privacy due to implementation
error: rather, they develop a technique to establish a bound on the error, and show that this technique can
also be used to compute the sensitivity of a query, which is a parameter of the Laplacian noise.
1.2 Plan of the paper
This paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we recall some mathematical definitions and introduce
some notation. In section 3, we describe the standard Laplacian-based mechanism that provides differ-
ential privacy in a theoretical setting. In section 4, we discuss the errors due to the implementation, and
we consider a set of assumptions which, if granted, allows us to establish a bound on the irregularities
of the noise caused by the finite-precision implementation. Furthermore we propose a correction to the
mechanism based on rounding and truncating the result. Finally, we provide our main theorem, stating
that with our correction the implementation of the mechanism still preserves differential privacy, and
establishing the precise degradation of the privacy parameter. The next two sections propose some appli-
cations of our result: Section 5 illustrates the technique for the case of Laplacian noise in one dimension
and section 6 shows how our theorem applies to the case of the Euclidean bivariate Laplacian. Section 7
concludes and discusses some future work.
For the sake of space, the proofs are omitted. The interested reader can find them in the full version
of this paper [14].
2 Preliminaries and notation
In this section, we recall some basic mathematical definitions and we introduce some notation that will
be useful in the rest of the paper. We will assume that the the queries give answers in Rm. Examples
of such queries are the tuples representing, for instance, the average height, weight, and age. Another
example comes from geolocation, where the domain is R2.
2.1 Distances and geometrical notations
There are several natural definitions of distance on Rm [21]. For m ∈ N and x = (x1, . . . ,xm) ∈ Rm, the
Lp norm of x, which we will denote by ‖x‖p, is defined as ‖x‖p = p
√
∑mi=1 |xi|p. The corresponding
distance function is dp(x,y) = ‖x− y‖p. We extend this norm and distance to p = ∞ in the usual way:
‖x‖∞ = maxi∈{1,...,m} |xi| and d∞(x,y) = ‖x− y‖∞. The notion of L∞ norm is extended to functions in the
following way: given f : A → Rm, we define ‖ f‖∞ = maxx∈A ‖ f (x)‖. When clear from the context, we
will omit the parameter p and write simply ‖x‖ and d(x,y) for ‖x‖p and dp(x,y), respectively.
Let S⊆Rm. We denote by Sc the complement of S, i.e., Sc =Rm \S. The diameter of S is defined as
(S) = max
x,y∈S
d(x,y).
For ε ∈R+, the +ε-neighbor and the −ε-neighbor of S are defined as
S+ε = {x | ∃s ∈ S,d(x,s) ≤ ε} S−ε = {x | ∀s ∈Rm,d(x,s) ≤ ε =⇒ s /∈ S}= ((Sc)+ε)c
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For x ∈Rm, the translations of S by x and −x are defined as
S+ x = {y+ x | y ∈ S} S− x = {y− x | y ∈ S}
2.2 Measure theory
We recall here some basic notions of measures theory that will be used in this paper.
Definition 2.1 (σ -algebra and measurable space). A σ -algebra T for a set M is a nonempty set of
subsets of M that is closed under complementation (wrt to M) and (potentially empty) enumerable union.
The tuple (M,T ) is called a measurable space.
Definition 2.2 (Measure). A positive measure µ on a measurable space (M,T ) is a function T →
R
+ ∪ {0} such that µ( /0) = 0 and whenever (Si) is a enumerable family of disjoint subset of M then
∑ µ(Si) = µ(⋃Si). A positive measure µ where µ(X) = 1 is called a probability measure.
A tuple (M,T ,P) where (M,T ) is a measurable space and P a probability measure is called proba-
bility space.
In this paper we will make use of the Lebesgue measure λ on (Rm,S ) where S is the Lebesgue
σ -algebra. The Lebesgue measure is the standard way of assigning a measure to subsets of Rm.
Definition 2.3 (Measurable function). Let (M,T ) and (V,Σ) be two measurable spaces. A function
f : M →V is measurable if f−1(v) ∈ T for all v ∈ Σ.
Definition 2.4 (Absolutely continuous). A measure ν is absolutely continuous according to a measure
µ , if for all M ∈S , µ(M) = 0 implies ν(M) = 0.
If a measure is absolutely continuous according to the Lebesgue measure then by the Radon-Nikodym
theorem, we can express it as an integration of a density function f : µ(M) = ∫M f (x)dλ .
2.3 Probability theory
Definition 2.5 (Random variable). Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and (E,E ) a measurable space.
Then a random variable is a measurable function X : Ω → E. We shall use the expression P [X ∈ B] to
denote P
(
X−1(B)
)
.
Let f : Rm →Rm be a measurable function and let X : Ω →Rm be a random variable. In this paper,
we will use the notation f (X) to denote the random variable Y : Ω →Rm such that f (X)(ω) = f (X(ω)).
In particular, for m∈Rm we denote by m+X the random variable Y : Ω →Rm such that ω 7→ X(ω)+m.
Definition 2.6 (Density function). Let X : Ω → E be a random variable. If there exists a function f
such that, for all S ∈S , P[X ∈ S] = ∫S f (u)du, then f is called the density function of X.
In this paper, we use the following general definition of the Laplace distribution (centered at zero).
Definition 2.7 (Laplace distribution). The density function F of a Laplace distribution with scale pa-
rameter b is Fb(x) = K(b)e−b‖x‖ where K(b) is a normalization factor which is determined by imposing∫
S Fb(x)dx = 1.
Definition 2.8 (Joint probability). Let (X ,Y ) be a pair of random variable on Rm. The joint probability
on (X ,Y ) is defined for all I,J ∈S as: P[(X ,Y ) ∈ (I,J)] = P[X ∈ I ∧ Y ∈ J].
Definition 2.9 (Marginals). Let X and Y : (Ω,F ,P) → (Rm,S ). The marginal probability of the
random variable (X ,Y ) for X is defined as: P[X ∈ B] = ∫
Rm
P[(X ,Y ) ∈ (B,dy)].
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3 Differential privacy in the exact semantics
In this section, we recall the definition of differential privacy and of the standard mechanisms to achieve
it, and we discuss its correctness.
3.1 Differential privacy
We denote by D the set of databases and we assume that the domain of the answers of the query is Rm
for some n ≥ 1. We denote by D1 ∼ D2 the fact that D1 and D2 differ by at most one element. Namely,
D2 is obtained from D1 by adding or removing one element.
Definition 3.1 (ε-differential privacy). A randomized mechanism A : D →Rm is ε-differentially private
if for all databases D1 and D2 in D with D1 ∼D2, and all S ∈S (the Lebegue σ -algebra), we have :
P[A (D1) ∈ S]≤ eε P[A (D2) ∈ S]
Definition 3.2 (sensitivity). The sensitivity ∆ f of a function f : D → Rm is
∆ f = sup
D1,D2∈D ,D1∼D2
d( f (D1), f (D2)).
3.2 Standard technique to implement differential privacy
The standard technique to grant differential privacy is to add random noise to the true answer to the
query. In the following, we denote the query by f : D → Rm. This is usually a deterministic function.
We represent the noise as a random variable X : Ω → Rm. The standard mechanism, which we will
denote by A0, returns a probabilistic value which is the sum of the true result and of a random variable
X , namely:
Mechanism 1.
A0(D) = f (D)+X
3.3 Error due to the implementation of the query
The correctness of a mechanism A , if we do not take the implementation error into account, consists
in A being ε-differentially private. However, we are interested in analyzing the correctness of the
implemented mechanism. We start here by discussing the case in which, in mechanism 1, the noise X is
exact but we take into account the approximation error in the implementation of f .
Notation Given a function g, we will indicate by g′ its implementation, i.e. the function that, for any x,
gives as result the value actually computed for g(x), with all the approximation and representation errors.
The first thing we observe is that the implementation of f can give a sensitivity ∆ f ′ greater than ∆ f and
we need to take that into account. In fact, in the exact semantics the correctness of the mechanism relies
on the fact that d( f (D1), f (D2))≤∆ f . However, with rounding errors, we may have d( f ′(D1), f ′(D2))>
∆ f . Hence we need to require the following property, usually stronger than differential privacy.
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Condition 1. Given a mechanism A (D) = f ′(D)+X, we say that A satisfies Condition 1 with degree ε
(the desired degree of differential privacy) if the random variable X has a probability distribution which
is absolutely continuous according to the Lebesgue measure, and
∀S ∈S ,r1,r2 ∈ Rm,P[r1 +X ∈ S]≤ e
ε
d(r1 ,r2)
∆ f ′ P[r2 +X ∈ S]
Remark 1. In general we expect that an analysis of the implementation of f will provide some bound
on the difference between f and f ′, and that will allow us to provide a bound on ∆ f ′ in terms of ∆ f . For
instance, if ‖ f − f ′‖ ≤ δ f then we get ∆ f ′ ≤ ∆ f +2δ f .
Theorem 3.1. Condition 1 implies that the mechanism A (D) = f ′(D) +X is ε-differentially private
(w.r.t. f ′).
The following theorem shows that Condition 1 is actually equivalent to differential privacy in the
case of Laplacian noise.
Theorem 3.2. Let A (D) = f ′(D)+X be a mechanism, and assume that X is Laplacian. If A is ε-
differentially private (w.r.t. f ′), then Condition 1 holds.
4 Error due to the implementation of the noise
In this section we consider the implementation error in the noise, trying to make as few assumptions as
possible about the implementation of real numbers and of the noise function.
We start with example which shows that any finite implementation makes it impossible for a mech-
anism to achieve the degree of privacy predicted by the theory (i.e. the degree of privacy it has in the
exact semantics). This example is more general than the one in the introduction in the sense that it does
not rely on any particular implementation of the real numbers, just on the (obvious) assumption that in
a physical machine the representation of numbers in memory is necessarily finite. On the other hand it
is less “dramatic” than the one in the introduction, because it only shows that the theoretical degree of
privacy degrades in the implementation, while the example in the introduction shows a case in which
ε-differential privacy does not hold (in the implementation) for any ε .
Example 4.1. Consider the standard way to produce a random variable with a given probability law,
such as the Laplace distribution. Randomness on most computers is generated with integers. When we
call a function that returns a uniform random value on the representation of reals, the function generates a
random integer z (with uniform law) between 0 and N (in practice N ≥ 232) and returns u= z/N. From this
uniform random generator, we compute n(z/N) where n depends on the probability distribution we want
to generate. For instance, to generate the Laplace distribution we have n(u) = −bsgn(u− 1/2) ln(1−
2|u− 1/2|) which is the inverse of the cumulative function of the Laplace distribution. However the
computation of n is performed in the finite precision semantics, i.e. n is a function F→ F where F is
the finite set of the representable numbers. In this setting, the probability of getting some value x for
our noise depends on the number of integers z such that n(z/N) = x : if there are k values for z such
that n(z/N) = x then the probability of getting x is k/N. This means, in particular, that, if the theoretical
probability for a value x is 1.5/N, then the closest probability actually associated with the drawing of x
is either 1/N or 2/N and in both cases the error is at least 33%. In figure 2, we illustrate how the error on
the distribution breaks the differential-privacy ratio that holds for the theoretical distribution. The ratio
between the two theoretical Laplacian distributions is 4/3. However, since the actual distribution is issued
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Figure 2: The probability distributions of Laplace noises generated from a discretized uniform generator
from a discretization of the uniform generator, the resulting distribution is a step function. So when the
theoretical probability is very low like in x0, the discretization creates an artificial ratio of 2 instead of
4/3.
4.1 The initial uniform random generator
To generate a random variable, programing languages have only one primitive that generates a random
value between 0 and 1 that aims to be uniform and independent across several calls.Hence, to get a
random variable with a non uniform distribution, we generate it with a function that makes calls to this
random generator. For instance, to draw a value from a random variable X on R distributed according
to the cumulative function C : R→]0,1], it is sufficient to pick a value u from the uniform generator in
]0,1] and then return C−1(u).
We identify three reasons why a uniform random generator may induce errors. The first has been
explained in the introduction: finite precision allows generating only N different numbers such that when
we apply a function on the value picked some values are missing and other are over represented. The
second reason comes from the generator itself which can returns the N values with different probabilities
even though we might assume that they are returned with probability 1/N: furthermore, some values
may not even be returned at all. A third error is due to the dependence of returned results when we pick
several random values. Indeed most of the generator implementations are indeed pseudo generators:
when a value is picked the next one is generated as a hash function of the first one. This means that if we
have N possibilities for one choice then we also have N possible pairs of successive random values.
To reason about implementation leakage, we have to take into account all of these sources of errors.
We propose the following model. In the exact semantics, the uniform random variable Uq is generated
from a cross product of q uniform independent variables U (with q≥m). We denote by u1, . . . ,uq ∈ [0,1]q
the values picked by our perfect random generator. Then we consider the random variable Uq′ actually
provided as generated from a function n0 : Rq → Rq, (u′1, . . . ,u′q) = n0(u1, . . . ,uq). We assume that the
bias, i.e., the difference between n0 and the identity, is bounded by some δ0 ∈R+:
‖n0− Id‖∞ ≤ δ0. (1)
4.2 The function n for generating the noise
From the value u (resp. u′) drawn according to the distribution Uq in the exact semantics (resp. according
to Uq′ in the actual implementation), we generate another value by applying the functions n and n′
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respectively. Let X = n(Uq) be the random variable with the exact distribution and X ′ = n′(Uq′) the
random variable with the actual one.
Definition 4.1. We denote by µ and ν the probability measure of X and X ′, respectively: for all S ∈S ,
µ(S) = P[n(Uq) ∈ S] = λ (n−1(S)) and ν(S) = P[n′(Uq′) ∈ S] = λ (n−10 (n−1(S))).
In order to establish a bound on the difference between the probability distribution of X and X ′ we
need some condition on the implementation n′ of n. For this purpose we use the notion of closeness that
we defined in [13].
Definition 4.2 ((k,δ )-close, [13]). Let A and B be metric spaces with distance dA and dB, respectively.
Let n and n′ be two functions from A to B and let k,δ ∈ R+. We say that n′ is (k,δ )-close to n if
∀u,v ∈ A,dB(n(u),n′(v))≤ k dA(u,v)+δ .
This condition is a combination of the k-Lipschitz property, that states a bound between the error on
the output and the error on the input, see below, and the implementation errors of n:
Definition 4.3 (k-Lipschitz). Let (A,dA) and (B,dB) be two metrics spaces and k ∈ R: A function n :
A → B is k-Lipschitz if:
∀u,v ∈ A,dB(n(u),n(v)) ≤ kdA(u,v)
In [13], we have proven the following relation between the properties of being k-Lipschitz and of
being (k,δ )-close.
Theorem 4.1 ([13]). If n is k-Lipschitz and ‖n−n′‖∞ ≤ δ then n and n′ are (k,δ )-close.
We strengthen now the relation by proving that (a sort of) the converse is also true.
Theorem 4.2. If there exist u,v, d(n(u),n(v)) > kd(u,v)+2δ then there exist no function n′ such that n
and n′ are (k,δ )-close.
Now, we would like n and n′ to be (k,δ )-close on Rm. However, this implies that A0 (mechanism 1)
cannot be ε-differentially-private. In fact, the latter would imply ‖n([0,1]q)‖∞ = ∞ otherwise certain
answers could be reported (with non-null probability) only in correspondence with certain true answers
and not with others. However, ‖n([0,1]q)‖∞ = ∞ and [0,1]q bounded implies there exist u,v, such that
d(n(u),n(v)) > kd(u,v)+2δ : we derive from theorem 4.2 that n′ cannot exist.
In order to keep computed results in a range where we are able to bound the computational errors,
one possible solution consists of a truncation of the result. The traditional truncation works as follows:
choose a subset Mr ⊂ Rm and, whenever the reported answer x is outside Mr return the closest point to
x in Mr. However, while such a procedure is safe in the exact semantics because remapping does not
alter differential privacy, problems might appears when n and n′ are not close. Furthermore, while in the
uni-dimensional case there are two disjoints set that are mapped one on the minimal value and the other
on the maximal value, in higher dimensions we have a connected set that is mapped on several points,
and on which the error is not bounded.
Therefore, to remain in a general framework where we do not have any additional knowledge about
computational errors for large numbers, we decide here to return an exception value when the result is
outside of some compact subset Mr of Rm. We denote by ∞ the value returned by the mechanism when
f ′(D)+X ′ /∈Mr. Hence, the truncated mechanism A returns the randomized value or ∞:
Mechanism 2.
A (D) =
{
f ′(D)+X ′ if f ′(D)+X ′ ∈Mr
∞ otherwise
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We truncate the result because we want to exclude non-robust computations from our mechanism.
However, such a procedure is effective only if unsafe computations remain outside the safe domain.
To grant this property we need two more conditions. One requires the implementation to respect the
monotonicity of the computed functions:
Condition 2. We say that a function g : Rm → Rk satisfies Condition 2 if, for all x,y ∈ Rm, ‖g(x)‖ ≤
‖g(y)‖ implies ‖g′(x)‖ ≤ ‖g′(y)‖.
With this property, even if the implementation is not robust for large values, if we know some result
is not in Mr then the result for any greater value is not in Mr either.
The other condition is about the closeness of the implementation of the noise and its exact semantics
in a safe area. For any δr ∈ R+, we consider the set Ur ⊂Uq defined as ∀u ∈Ur ‖n(u)‖ ≤ (Mr)+ δr
i.e. : Ur = n−1 ({y |‖y‖ ≤(Mr)+δr }).
Condition 3. We say that a noise n satisfies Condition 3 if n and n′ are (k,δn)-close on a set Ur such that
∀u ∈U cr f ′(D)+n(u) /∈M+kδ0+δnr
To find such a set Ur, one possible way is by a fix point construction. We begin by finding the smallest
k0 and δn0 such that n and n′ are (k0,δn0)-close on Mr. Then for the generic step m > 0, we compute the
smallest km+1 and δnm+1 such that n and n′ are (km+1,δnm+1)-close on Mkmδ0+δnmr .
If Conditions 2 and 3 hold, then from (1) we derive
∀u ∈U cr f ′(D)+n′(n0(u)) /∈Mr (2)
So whatever happens outside of Ur, the result will be truncated. We can then consider that there is no
implementation error outside Ur. Finally, we have a bound δt for the maximal shift between the exact
and the actual semantics:
δt = kδ0 +δn (3)
4.3 A distance between distributions
Given that we are in a probabilistic setting, the round-off errors cannot be measured in terms of numerical
difference as they can be in the deterministic case, they should rather be measured in terms of distance
between the theoretical distribution and the actual distribution. Hence, we need a notion of distance
between distributions. We choose to use the ∞-Wassertein distance [5] which, as we will show, is the
natural metric to measure our deviation.
Definition 4.4 (∞-Wassertein distance). Let µ , ν two probability measures on (Rm,S ) such that there
exist a compact Ω, µ(Ω) = ν(Ω) = 1, the ∞-Wassertein distance between µ and ν is defined as follows:
W∞(µ ,ν) = inf
γ∈Γ(µ ,ν)
(
inf
t≥0
(
γ
({
(x,y) ∈ (Rm)2∣∣d(x,y) > t}))= 0)
Where Γ(µ ,ν) denotes the collection of all measure on M×M with marginals µ and ν respectively.
If we denote by Supp(x,y), the support where γ(x,y) is non zero, we have an equivalent definition
[5] for the ∞-Wassertein distance:
W∞(µ ,ν) = inf
γ∈Γ(µ ,ν)
(
sup
Supp(x,y)
d(x,y)
)
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We extend this definition to any pair of measures that differ only on a compact (Mr in our case) by
considering the subset of Γ(µ ,ν) containing only measure γ(x,y) with γ(x,y) = 0 if x 6= y and either
x ∈Mcr or y ∈Mcr .
We have introduced this measure because it has a direct link with the computational error as expressed
by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Let X and X ′ be two random variables with distribution µ and ν respectively. We have
that ‖X −X ′‖∞ ≤ δ implies d(µ ,ν)≤ δ .
Proof We consider the measure γ on M×M, ∀A,B ∈S ,γ(A,B) = P(X ∈ A ∧ X ′ ∈ B). The marginals
of γ are µ and ν . Moreover, the support of γ is δ since P(X ∈ A ∧ X ′ ∈ B) = 0 when A and B are distant
by more than δ . Since we have such a γ the minimum on all the γ ∈ Γ(µ ,ν) is less than δ .
In our case, according to (3), we have d(µ ,ν) ≤ δt . The following theorem allow us to bound the µ
measure of some set with the measure ν .
Theorem 4.4.
d(µ ,ν) ≤ ε =⇒ ∀S ∈ Rm,ν(S−ε)≤ µ(S)≤ ν(Sε)
Proof The property of marginals is ν(S) =
∫
Rm×S dγ(x,y). Since γ(x,y) = 0 if d(x,y) > ε , we derive
ν(S) =
∫
Sε×S dγ(x,y). Then we get ν(S) ≤
∫
Sε×Rm dγ(x,y). The last expression is the marginal of γ in
Sε , hence by definition of marginal: ν(S) ≤ µ(Sε ). The other inequality is obtain by considering the
complement set of S (Rm \S).
4.4 Rounding the answer
Once the computation of A (D) is achieved, we cannot yet return the answer, because it could still leak
some information. Indeed, the distribution of X and X ′ are globally the same, but, on a very small scale,
the distributions could differ a lot. We prevent this problem by rounding the result:
Mechanism 3. The mechanism rounds the result by returning the value closest to f (D)+ n′ in some
discrete subset S′. So K (D) = r(A (D)) where r is the rounding function.
From the above rounding function we define the set S ′0 of all sets that have the same image under
r. Then we define the σ -algebra S ′ generated by S ′0: it is the closure under union of all these sets.
Observe now that it is not possible for the user to measure the probability that the answer belongs to a
set which is not in S ′. Hence our differential privacy property becomes:
∀S ∈S ′,P[A (D1) ∈ S]≤ eε P[A (D2) ∈ S] (4)
In this way we grant that any measurable set has a minimal measure and we prevent the inequality
from being violated when probabilities are small. The following value R represents the robustness of the
rounding.
R = max
S∈S ′0,S 6= /0
λ (S+δt \S−δt )
λ (S−δt ) (5)
Now, we are able to prove that if all conditions are met, then the implementation of the mechanism
satisfies differential privacy.
Theorem 4.5. A K mechanism that respects Conditions 1–3 is ε ′-differentially private, with:
∀S ∈S ,P[A ′(D1) ∈ S]≤ eε ′P[A ′(D2) ∈ S]
where ε ′ = ε + ln(1+Re
ε L+δt∆ f ′ ), δt = kδ0 +δn and L = maxS∈S ′0 S.
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5 Application to the Laplacian noise in one dimension
In this section we illustrate how to use our result in the case in which the domain of the answers is R.
The noise added for the protocol, stated in the mechanism 1, is the Laplacian centered in 0 with scale
parameter ∆ f ′/ε . Theorem 3.2 implies that Condition 1 holds for ε . We truncate the result outside of
some interval Mr = [m,M].
Implementation of the n function To generate a centered Laplacian distribution from a uniform ran-
dom variable U in ]0,1], a standard method consists in using the inverse of the cumulative function, i.e.
X = n(U) = −bsgn(U − 1/2) ln(1− 2|U − 1/2|), where b is the intended scale parameter (∆ f ′ε in our
case). Hence our exact function n is
n(u) =
∆ f ′
ε
sgn(u−1/2) ln(1−2|u−1/2|). (6)
Closeness of n and n′ In order to apply our theorem, we need to prove that Condition 3 is satisfied.
By theorem 4.1, it is sufficient to prove that, in the interval of interest, n(u) is k-Lipschitz and that
|n(u)− n′(u)| ≤ δn. Note that the values of δn and k in general depend on n and on its implementation
(often the logarithm is implemented by the CORDIC algorithm).
The logarithm function used by n is not k-Lipschitz for any k. However, we are interested in the
behavior of n when |n(u)| ≤M−m. From the definition of n in (6), we have:
dn
du(u)≤ dnmax =
2∆ f ′
ε
e
ε(Mr)
∆ f ′
in Ur = {u|n(u) ≤ M−m}. So our function n is dnmax-Lipschitz. Finally, our global error is
δt =
2∆ f ′
ε
e
ε(Mr )
∆ f ′ δ0 +δn
Rounding the result The rounding process generates a σ -algebra S ′ composed by small intervals of
length L where L is the accuracy step of the rounding. In that case, the value defined in (5) is R = L+2δtL−2δt .
Differential privacy By Theorem 4.5, the implementation of our mechanism is ε ′-differentially private
with
ε ′ = ε + ln(1+ L+2δt
L−2δt e
ε L+δt∆ f ′ )
Remark 2. In case our answer is not in [m,M], we can return −∞ or +∞ instead of ∞. The reason is
that even if the algorithm is not robust when |u−0.5| is small the sign is still correct. Then we can remap
−∞ to m and +∞ to M to get the usual truncation procedure.
6 Application to the Laplacian noise in R2
When the domain of the answers are the points of a map, like in the case of location-based applications,
it is natural to formalize it as the space R2 equipped with the Euclidean distance.
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According to the protocol, we sanitize the results by adding a random variable X . In this case, we
will use for X the bivariate Laplacian defined for the Euclidean metric [2] whose density function is:
p(x,y) = Keb
√
|x−x0 |2+|y−y0|2
where K is the normalization constant and b the scale parameter. Since we are using a Laplacian noise,
by Theorem 3.2, Condition 1 holds.
Truncation Since most of the time the domain studied is bound (for instance the public transportation
of a city is inside the limit of the city), we can do a truncation. However, we recall that our truncation
is made for robustness purpose and not just for utility reasons. Hence, if our domain of interest is a
circle, we will not choose Mr to be the same circle because the probability the truncation would return
an exception would be too high (more than one half if the true result is on the circumference).
Implementation of the n function Following [2], we compute the random variable by drawing an
angle and a distance independently. The angle θ is uniformly distributed in [−pi,pi[. The radius r has a
probability density Dε ,R(r) = ε2re−εr and cumulative function Cε(r) = 1− (1+ εr)e−εr . The radius can
therefore be drawn by setting r =C−1ε (u) where u is generated uniformly in ]0,1].
Robustness of n As in the previous section, we do not analyze an actual implementation but we care
about the k factor used for Condition 3. First, we analyze for which kC(ε ,(Mr)) the function C−1ε
is k-Lipschitz in [0,(Mr)]. Since C is differential, this question is equivalent to find the inverse of
the minimal value taken by its derivative function on the interval C−1ε ([0,(Mr)]). By computing this
minimum value, we get:
KC(ε ,(Mr)) =
eε(Mr)
2ε + rε2
On the other hand, the computation of θ is just a multiplication by 2pi of the uniform generator hence
kθ = 2pi . Then, with the conversion (r,θ) 7→ (r cos(θ),r sin(θ)) from polar coordinates to Cartesian
coordinates we obtain the global k factor:
k =
√
KC(ε ,(Mr))2 +2pi(Mr)
Let δn be the distance between n and n′, and δ0 be the error of the uniform generator. From (3) we get:
δt =
√
KC(ε ,(Mr))2 +2pi(Mr)δ0 +δn.
Rounding the answer We now compute the parameter R in (5). The rounding is made in the Cartesian
coordinates, hence the inverse image of any returned value is a square S of length L. Note that Sδt is
included in the square of length L+ 2δt and S−δt is a square of length L− 2δt . Hence the ratio value is
smaller than R = (L+2δtL−2δt )
2
.
Differential privacy By Theorem 4.5 we get that (the implementation of) our mechanism is ε ′-differentially
private with
ε ′ = ε + ln(1+(L+2δt
L−2δt )
2e
ε L+δt∆ f ′ )
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7 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have shown that, in any implementation of mechanisms for differential privacy, the finite
precision representation of numbers in any machine induces approximation errors that cause the loss of
the privacy property. To solve this problem, we have proposed a method based on rounding the answer
and raising an exception when the result is outside some values. The main result of our paper is that the
above method is sound in the sense that it preserves differential privacy at the price of a degradation of
the privacy degree. To prove this result, we needed to pay special attention at expressing the problem in
terms of probability theory and at defining the link between computational error and distance between
probability distributions. Finally, we have shown how to apply our method to the case of the linear
Laplacian and to that of bivariate Laplacian.
As future developments of this work, we envisage two main lines of research:
• Deepening the study of the implementation error in differential privacy: there are several directions
that seem interesting to pursue, including:
– Improving the mechanisms for generating basic random variables. For instance, when gen-
erating a one-dimensional random variable, it may have some advantage to pick more values
from the uniform random generator, instead than just one (we recall that the standard method
is to draw one uniformly distributed value in ]0,1] and then apply the inverse of the cumula-
tive function). For instance, u1 + u2 has a density function with a triangular shape and cost
only one addition. The other advantage is due to the finite representation: if the uniform
random generator can pick N different values then two calls of it generate N2 possibilities,
which enlarge considerably the number of possibilities, and therefore reduce the “holes” in
the distribution.
– Considering more relaxed versions of differential privacy, for instance the (ε ,δ )-differential
privacy allows for a (small) additive shift δ between the two likelihoods in Definition 3.1 and
it is therefore more tolerant to the implementation error. It would be worth investigating for
what values of δ (if any) the standard implementation of differential privacy is safe.
• Enlarging the scope of this study to the more general area of quantitative information flow. There
are various notions of information leakage that have been considered in the computer security
literature; the one considered in differential privacy is just one particular case. Without the pretense
of being exhaustive, we mention the information-theoretic approaches based on Shannon entropy
[9, 18, 7] and those based on Rényi min-entropy [22, 4] and the more recent approach based on
decision theory [1]. The main difference between differential privacy and these other notions
of leakage is that in the former any violation of the bound in the likelihood ratio is considered
catastrophic, while the latter focuses on the average amount of leakage, and it is therefore less
sensitive to the individual violations. However, even though the problem of the implementation
error may be attenuated in general by the averaging, we expect that there are cases in which it may
still represent a serious problem.
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A Proofs of theorems 3.1 and 3.2
Theorem 3.1
Proof Let D1 and D2 be two databases such that D1 ∼ D2. Let r1 = f ′(D1) and r2 = f ′(D2) be two
answers. By definition of sensitivity, d(r1,r2)≤ ∆ f ′ so e
ε
d(r1,r2)
∆ f ′ ≤ eε . Hence,
P[A (D1) ∈ S]≤ eε P[A (D2) ∈ S]
Theorem 3.2
Proof First, we show that if A is ε-differentially private then b ≤ ε∆ f ′ holds for the scale parameter b
of X . Let D1 ∼ D2 with d( f ′(D1), f ′(D2)) = ∆ f ′ . By ε-differential privacy we have, for any S ∈S :
P[ f ′(D1)+X ∈ S]≤ eε P[ f ′(D2)+X ∈ S]
From the density function of the Laplace noise (Definition 2.7), we derive:
K(n,d)dλ ≤ eε K(n,d)e−b∆ f ′dλ
Hence,
b ≤ ε
∆ f ′
. (7)
Now, by definition of the density function, we have
P[r2 +X ∈ S] =
∫
x∈S
K(n,d)e−bd(x,r2)dλ
From the triangular inequality, we derive:
P[r2 +X ∈ S]≥
∫
x∈S
K(n,d)e−b(d(x,r1)+d(r1,r2))dλ
Hence,
P[r2 +X ∈ S]≥ e−bd(r2,r1)
∫
x∈S
e−bd(r1,x)dλ
From inequality (7), we derive:
P[r2 +X ∈ S]≥ e
− εd(r2 ,r1)∆ f ′
∫
x∈S
e−bd(r1,x)dλ
Finally,
P[r2 +X ∈ S]≥ e
− εd(r2,r1)∆ f ′ P[r1 +X ∈ S]
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B Proof of the main theorem 4.5
Proof Let S in S . We first consider the case S 6= ∞.
Define P1 = P[A ′(D1) ∈ Sa] and P2 = P[A ′(D2)∈ Sa]. Since the result has been rounded (Definition
3), it is equivalent to consider the set S′ ∈S ′ with S′ = r−1(S) instead of Sa.
Now we have Pi = P[ f ′(Di)+ n′(X) ∈ S′] = P[n′(X) ∈ S′− f ′(Di)] where i is 1 or 2. Since ν is the
measure associated to n′, we have
Pi = ν(S′− f ′(Di))
From (3) and Theorem 4.3, d(ν ,µ)≤ δt . From Theorem 4.4 we derive
P1 ≤ µ(Sδt − f ′(D1)) and P2 ≥ µ(S−δt − f ′(D2)).
The additivity property of measures grants us µ(Sδt ) = µ(S−δt ) + µ(Sδt − S−δt). Condition 1 can be
expressed in term of the measure as:
∀S ∈S ,r ∈ Rm‖r‖,µ(S) ≤ eε
‖r‖
∆ f ′ µ(S− r)
From this inequality, we can derive, since ‖r‖= ∆ f ′ :
µ(Sε)≤ eε P2 +µ(Sδt \S−δt )
Since the probability is absolutely continuous according to the Lebesgue measure (Condition 1), we
can express the probability with a density function p:
∀S ∈S ,µ(S) =
∫
S
p(x)dλ
We derive:
∀S ∈S ,min
x∈S
p(x)≤ µ(S)λ (S)
By applying this property on S−δt − f ′(D2), we get:
min
x∈S−δt− f ′(D2)
p(x)≤ µ(S
−δt − f ′(D2))
λ (S−δt − f ′(D2))
We derive:
∃x0 ∈ S− f ′(D2), p(x0)≤ P2λ (S)
By the triangular inequality, we can bound the distance between x0 and any point of Sδt by ∆ f ′+L+δt
Hence, from Condition 1 we derive:
∀x ∈ Sδt − f ′(D1), p(x) ≤ e
ε
∆ f ′+L+δt
∆ f ′ p(x0)
Then by integration:
µ(Sδt − f ′(D1)\S−δt )≤ e
ε
∆ f ′+L+δt
∆ f ′ λ (S
δt \S−δt )
λ (S−δt ) P2
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We apply the condition 5:
µ(Sδt − f ′(D1)\S−δt)≤ e
ε
∆ f ′+L+δt
∆ f ′ RP2
Finally we obtain :
P1 ≤ (1+Re
ε L+δt∆ f ′ )eε P2
In case S is ∞, due to (2), P[A ′(D) = ∞] is the same as P[ f ′(D)+X ′ ∈Mcr] where d(µ ,ν) ≤ δt .
Moreover, Mcr can be decomposed in a enumerable disjoint union of element of S0. Therefore, the first
part of the proof applies: ε ′-differential privacy holds for all these elements. By the additivity of the
measure of disjoint union we conclude.
